

I. SOCIAL-POLITICAL AND CIVILIZATIONAL ASPECTS

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The Age of the State and Sociopolitical Destabilization: Preliminary Results of the Quantitative Analysis*

Leonid E. Grinin

*HSE University, Moscow, Russia;
Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, Russia*

Stanislav E. Bilyuga

Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

Andrey V. Korotayev

*HSE University, Moscow, Russia;
Institute of Oriental Studies,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia*

Anton L. Grinin

*Moscow State Lomonosov University, Moscow, Russia;
HSE University, Moscow, Russia*

Abstract

The article provides a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the correlation between the age of state and statehood as a whole and the risk of state destabilization. On the whole, an inversely proportional relationship has been revealed. All things equal, the longer a state exists, the lower the risk of its destabilization. A quantitative analysis of the correlation between the logarithm of the age of states and the integral CNTS index of sociopolitical destabilization is presented. In the paper the decile correlation analysis is used as the main method, as simple parametric linear regression in this case greatly underestimates the real strength of the relationship. In general, the decile analysis shows strong correlation be-

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tween the logarithm of the age of statehood and the mean value of the aggregate index of sociopolitical destabilization ($r = 0.81$) and statistically significant ($p = 0.004$). Overall, the logarithm of the age of statehood explains about 66 % of the variance of the aggregate index of sociopolitical destabilization by deciles. An explanation for this correlation is presented. It is shown that a particularly high level of sociopolitical instability is characteristic of very young states under the age 9 years. But the transition to the next time period (9–25 years) results in a significant reduction in the average level of sociopolitical instability. An especially marked increase in the level of stability of states occurs during the transition to the time period of 25–35 years. Overall, the average level of sociopolitical instability for the oldest states (with an age of more than 200 years) appears to be more than 30 times lower than for the youngest states. The analysis shows the high potential of sociopolitical destabilization inherent in any kind of separatism/independence struggle. Even if the struggle for independence is conducted under absolutely just slogans, it is still associated with serious long-term risks of sociopolitical destabilization simply because the creation of any new state significantly increases the risks of sociopolitical destabilization in the respective territory for coming years.

Keywords: age of state, statehood, stateness, destabilization, young state, failed states, Africa, risks of sociopolitical destabilization.

Introduction

Although the relationship between the development of the state, its ability to withstand destabilizing influences, on the one hand, and the age of statehood, on the other hand, seems obvious, the analysis of this relationship has clearly not received enough attention in the literature, and in the works that address these issues, the analysis is not conducted in a systematic way. In fact, this is the case with the theory of nation-building; this theory is also linked to research based on social integration theory. This trend emerged in the 1950s and experienced a boom in the 1970s and the 1990s – the 2000s. Since nation-building could not ignore ethnic aspects, some researchers have noted that ‘there has been some ethnic basis for the construction of modern nations’ (Smith 1986: 147). Accordingly, it is easier for a more mature ethnic group to create a state.

Within that framework, the very concept of the nation state has been explored. It has been argued that nations are the product of industrialization and modernization and that the desire to have its own state appears together with the formation of a nation (see, e.g., Gellner 1983, 1991; Grinin 2008, 2010, 2011a, 2012a). Accordingly, the more experience nation-building has, the more successful the creation of one's own state will be. But these authors did not draw direct conclusions as to how the age of the state affects its stability.

Within the framework of the analysis of failed states and the successes and failures of the U.S. in nation-building, some researchers also indirectly linked the age of statehood and the success of such building. The book edited by F. Fukuyama *Nation Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (2006) can be mentioned here. Fukuyama writes that the U.S. had far more success in helping to rebuild war-torn societies, such as postwar Japan and Germany, than in building states from scratch. Of course, this is not coincidental. But it is due to the fact that states with a long existence of statehood are much more capable of successful reform and reconstruction than new states (*Ibid.*). In any case, nation-building takes a lot of time. Pointing this out in his review of the above-mentioned book edited by F. Fukuyama, G. J. Ikenberry (2006a) also established an important fact, both in itself and within the framework of our study, that successful cases of the US-sponsored nation-building

apparently, are associated with the American military presence in the respective countries. The efforts in Cuba lasted for a short time, less than a decade, and ultimately ended in failure. The democratic state building in the Philippines was successful, although it took 50 years for the United States to grant independence to the Philippines, and then almost another 50 years to finally withdraw its military forces from there (*Ibid.*: 153; *Idem* 2006b).

Thus, the adherents of this direction conclude that successful nation-building requires strict measures over a long period of time.

It is also worth mentioning Samuel Huntington's monograph *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Huntington 1968). Although he does not explicitly analyze the relationship between the age of statehood and stability, but he clearly implies this by starting his research with the following assertion,

The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities. Communist totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the category of effective rather than debile political systems... In all these characteristics the political systems of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union differ significantly from the governments which exist in many, if not most, of the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America... [where there is] a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate government (Huntington 1968: 1–2).

As an important factor contributing to the emergence of effective state power, Huntington (*Ibid.*: 21) identifies strong, adaptable and coherent social institutions, recognition by citizens of the legitimacy of authority and effective

bureaucracies (as well as some other characteristics), which obviously requires the long existence of stateness and the perception by residents of the state as the only possible type of political organization in the relevant territory (see below), which can also be achieved only due to long history of statehood.

Nevertheless, despite such indirect conclusions about a direct positive relationship between the duration of the state and its strength (and an inverse negative relationship between the age of the state and the strength of the destabilization processes), there is little research in which this relationship is a central theme.

Although this issue remains insufficiently explored in the scientific literature, there are still works devoted to the study of the influence of the age of statehood on some factors related to its stability.

Special attention is given to the state experience. Thus, it is noted that younger states usually have less fiscal capacity than older ones (Tilly 1992; Collier 2009). At the same time, it has been pointed that with the increase in the age of the state, the amount of rent that the government office receives from the population may also increase which can lead to some economic stagnation (Olson 1982). In addition, according to some authors, despite an established bureaucratic infrastructure older states tend to be more autocratic in conditions of instability and excessive tax collection (*Idem* 1993).

While examining the relationship between the existence of the state and the income levels, S. P. Harish and Ch. Paik found an inverse U-shaped relationship between the mean duration of state rule and GDP per capita (Harish and Paik 2016). Against the background of the strong correlation between the level of GDP per capita and the intensity of coups (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Bouzid 2011; Korotayev, Vaskin *et al.* 2017, 2018; Korotayev, Grinin *et al.* 2017: 59–63) this would seem to suggest the possibility of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the duration of state rule and the intensity of coups and coup attempts¹.

On the other hand, Ch. Kenny used the age of the independent state existence as one of the independent regression variables to identify the factors influencing the level of per capita income for OECD countries. This variable turned out to be statistically significantly positive relation to per capita income (Kenny 1999), which in the light of the above considerations makes us to suggest that there is a statistically significantly negative correlation between the age of state existence and at least the intensity of coups.

As is easy to see, the research is insufficient and even contradictory which makes it worthwhile to conduct a special quantitative study of the general correlation between the age of the state and its characteristic level of socio-political instability.

¹ It should be noted that our researches did not confirm this hypothesis.

Materials and Methods

For an empirical assessment of the degree of sociopolitical stabilizing influence of the age of statehood as an independent variable, we calculated the time indicator of the state existence.

The calculation was based on the date of independence for each state (see Appendix) taken from the historical dictionary *A Dictionary of World History* (Kerr and Wright 2015), published by Oxford University Press in 2015. *The Soviet Historical Encyclopaedia* in 16 volumes (Zhukov 1961–1976) and the reference books *World Countries* were also used to clarify the dates (see Goryachkina and Yarich 1986, 2005, 2017, *etc.*).

The integral socio-political destabilization index *CNTS* (Cross National Time Series database [Banks and Wilson 2017] was taken as a dependent variable, variable domestic9)².

We used decile correlation analysis as the main method, since a simple parametric linear regression in this case significantly underestimates the real strength of the relationship. The fact is that a simple parametric Linear Least Squares regression assumes the normal distribution of the dependent variable (see, *e.g.*, Hilbe 2011). Meanwhile, the variables describing the intensity of sociopolitical destabilization are characterized by distribution that is different from normal with a disproportionately large number of zero values. Therefore, in this case, it makes sense to use for the analysis the aggregate values of the relevant indicator for the relevant years by deciles – the average value of the aggregate sociopolitical destabilization index *CNTS* for all decile country-years, which allows to normalize the distribution. We used the logarithm of the age of statehood to normalize the distribution by state age.

Test

A decile correlation analysis of the relationship between the logarithm of the age of statehood and the *CNTS* integral sociopolitical destabilization index for the period of 1919–2015 gives the following results (see Fig. 1).

² On the description and methodology of the *Cross National Time Series (CNT)* see Korotayev, Khokhlova, and Tsirel 2017: 37–82.




Fig. 1. Correlation between the logarithm of the age of statehood and mean per decile values of the CNTS integral sociopolitical destabilization index normalized per million people for the corresponding year, 1919–2015 (scatter plot with fitted logarithmic regression line)³

Sources: Banks and Wilson 2017; Riches and Palmowski 2016.

Note: $R^2 = 0.66$, $r = 0.814$, $p = 0.004$.

As we can see, the highest average value of the integral socio-political destabilization index CNTS (over 900) is typical for 10 % of the youngest states (*i.e.*, the states of the first decile with the age of less than nine years). The average value of the destabilization index is on average less by one third for the states of the second and third deciles (with the age of 9–25 years). The average value of the socio-political destabilization index for the states of the fourth decile (25–35 years) is almost five times less than for the youngest states of the first decile. Particularly low values of the socio-political destabilization index are among the oldest states (with the age of more than 200 years) – the mean value of the instability index for them is more than 30 times less than for the youngest states!

On the whole, the correlation between the logarithm of the age of statehood and the average value of the aggregate sociopolitical destabilization index is strong ($r = 0.81$) and obviously statistically significant in a decile analysis ($p = 0.004$). The logarithm of the age of statehood explains about 66 % of the variance of the aggregate sociopolitical destabilization index by deciles.

³ Deciles by age of the statehood include the following values: the 1st decile – up to 9 years; the 2nd decile – from 9 to 17 years; the 3rd decile – from 17 to 25 years; the 4th decile – from 25 to 35 years; the 5th decile – from 35 to 47 years; the 6th decile – from 47 to 64; the 7th decile – from 64 to 99 years; the 8th decile – from 99 to 140 years; the 9th decile – from 140 to 205; the 10th decile – over 205 years.

Note that a pronounced deviation is the 9th decile of countries with an age of 140 to 205 years, among which we observe a significantly high average level of intensity of sociopolitical destabilization than would be expected based on the regression equation. In our opinion, it is explained by the fact that a very high proportion in this group of countries is Latin American states. As we know, stateness in these countries was formed facing a number of difficulties due to the lack of established nations and the common spread of the Spanish language, which made the borders between the countries rather conventional. It should be noted that during the Spanish colonial period, the borders between the future countries were not established as state borders. But after the War of Independence, as a result of continuous wars they changed frequently. In addition, statehood in these countries for a long time (up to the present) was formed with a disproportionately high role of the military strata, which led to constant military coups⁴. The development of stateness was also hindered by the weak integration of nations in the countries of this continent, taking into account the diverse racial and ethnic composition of the population and antagonism between the Creole upper strata and the majority of the Indian population. Another important feature was the permanent conflict between those who tried to establish a democratic system and the military, who constantly committed coups. Unlike European and Asian countries where the statehood was based on the strong legitimacy of the monarchical system and the recognition of the ruling dynasties, in Latin America the legitimization of the state system was weak and led to widespread lawlessness, corruption and the break from tradition. Thus, despite a nominally long history of statehood in these countries statehood there in the modern sense of the word has developed quite recently.

Discussion

On the whole, obtained results correlate well with some of the results of our previous studies. In our works (see Grinin 2009, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2012b, 2013c, 2015a, 2015b, 2022b; Grinin and Korotayev 2016: Ch. 2, 3; 2024b) we have repeatedly mentioned the important fact that a long experience of statehood and nation-building is necessary for the creation of a more or less sustainable state.

Using various societies as examples, we have considered it from different aspects.

Firstly, we have investigated the typology of statehood and concluded that the most sustainable statehood is the so-called mature state corresponding to the period of industrialization and modernization (Grinin 2010). However, young states, especially those without a history of statehood and populated by immature ethnic formations (this correlates with what is called tribalism), cannot

⁴ Thus, in the two decades after World War II, successful coups d'etats occurred in 17 of 20 Latin American countries (only Mexico, Chile and Uruguay maintaining constitutional processes) (Huntington 1968).

immediately establish such a type of statehood. In many respects, this statehood still resembles the most archaic type – the early state (*Idem* 2011b; Grinin 2008).

Accordingly, not all of these states have sovereignty. At the same time, there are a number of theories in which the ‘quality’ of sovereignty of countries of different levels and degrees of independence (*e.g.*, so-called quasi-states [Jackson 1990], fragile states [Hagesteijn 2008], failed states [Rotberg 2004], ‘defective’, ‘incomplete’ states, *etc.*) differs. We have shown that failed states are either young states without traditions of statehood, or those in which statehood is sporadic or not well-established, forming a more or less fragile superstructure, and the bulk of the population is governed by other (non-state) forms (*e.g.*, Afghanistan). One can agree with R. Hagesteijn's statement (2008) that it makes sense to make comparisons between fragile states and early state, which is usually only a superstructure over the society (for more details see Grinin 2003, 2011a, 2012a). The countries with stronger traditions of statehood have more chances to overcome a severe crisis (*e.g.*, Ethiopia, Kampuchea and Laos). In addition, when analyzing particular societies' successfulness along with their neighbours' failures in terms of the strength and sustainability of the regime, it is often possible to find that this strength is not accidental, but related to more stable traditions of statehood than among neighbours. Let us take, for example, Morocco, which managed to get through the period of the Arab Spring period without upheavals mainly due to the regime of the constitutional monarchy, since according to the constitution (2011), in Morocco the king is the spiritual head of the Moroccan Muslims and a symbol of national unity which strengthens the legitimacy of his power in relation to Muslims. In addition, statehood in Morocco has deeper roots than, say, in Tunisia or Algeria, and in general, the traditions of statehood and monarchism in Morocco are stronger than in many other countries of the Middle East. Royalty is inherited in the direct male line in the Alaouite family (ruling since the 1730s), who are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. All this serves as additional bonds keeping society from destabilization (Landa and Savateev 2015: 162).

The problems of young states are particularly characteristic of Africa. This is one of the main reasons why we forecast that Africa will become the most troubled continent of the World System in the future (see, *e.g.*, Grinin 2022b; Grinin and Korotayev 2023a, 2023b, 2024a, 2024b; Korotayev, Shulgin *et al.* 2023; Medvedev *et al.* 2022; Ustyuzhanin and Korotayev 2022; Zinkina and Korotayev 2022a, 2022b). The process of rapid modernization in any state poses an increased risk of destabilization, and in the context of Africa, the risk is particularly increased (Grinin 2022a; Korotayev, Zinkina *et al.* 2011).

The young age of most states in Africa also gives us grounds to conclude that in the 21st century (possibly already in its first half) it is Africa that will be the continent where the greatest number of revolutions, conflicts, and extremist explosions will occur, due to the fact that African countries are still in the process (often in the initial stages) of modernization, urbanization, formation of ethno-political nations, and the development of mature statehood.

The problems of young states are often associated with insufficient 'cohesion' between society and state. This is particularly characteristic of young, newly formed states in areas where statehood has not been developed as a whole (e.g., in sub-Saharan Africa), where the population realize themselves in a different social space (villages, tribes, small ethnic groups, etc.). We have concluded that the need for statehood (and in a certain form of a political regime) should become immanent in the public consciousness, become part of the mentality, culture and even the way of life of the population, which requires centuries of state traditions (by the way, in Latin America, a significant part of the population, especially the Indian, has not felt this need for a long time). According to Friedrich Ratzel, the boundaries should become the peripheral organs of the state, but not to remain an artificial border separating the territory inhabited by kindred tribes. Otherwise, instability, disintegration, permanent crisis are inevitable. In this regard, one should pay attention to the fact that most of the existing countries (and in Tropical Africa the absolute majority) have a very short (just a few decades) history of their national independence and, accordingly, sovereignty. The establishment of a sustainable stateness, as is well known, requires centuries, traditions and mentality of statehood.

It is not surprising that African countries consistently lead the list by Fragile States Index (Messner *et al.* 2015) (see Fig. 2). The conditions for a systemic crisis can arise when the level of engineering and technology (especially military) far exceeds the level of statehood. This is another reason for the formation of fragile or failed states.



Fig. 2. The map of failed states

Source: Messner *et al.* 2015.

Note: failed states are shaded with dark color

Secondly, we considered this issue in connection with certain types of crises in states (Grinin 2013a, 2013b, 2012b). In particular, we have found that crises in the state are associated with accelerated development in various spheres as a result of modernization (Grinin 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2022; Korotayev *et al.* 2018; Huntington 1968; *etc.*). A number of researchers highlighted the connection between revolution and modernization (see, *e.g.*, Lipset 1959; Cutright 1963; Moore 1966; Dahl 1971; Brunk *et al.* 1987; Rueschemeyer *et al.* 1992; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Londregan and Poole 1996; Epstein *et al.* 2006; Bois 2011; Huntington 1968; Hobsbaum 1999; Starodubrovskaya and Mau 2004; Goldstone 2015).

This aspect is important even because the need for *economic reconstruction and development* is formulated as recommendation for state-building (see, *e.g.*, Dobbins *et al.* 2007). Otherwise the economy cannot be reconstructed and developed. In general, this is absolutely correct. It is impossible to create a modern state without a modern economy. However, one cannot ignore the fact that it is the rapidly developing societies that face the danger of falling into the trap of rapid transformation. One should remember that there are still a lot of states that are in the process of modernization or they are just at the beginning. Consequently, in the process of nation-building, special attention should be paid to preventing such imbalances in the socio-political system that can change it, which means that there is a need to find an internal consensus while preserving the development vector.

Thirdly, we have investigated the relationship between the absence or weakness of traditions of statehood and crises, in particular, in the Middle East (in Yemen, Libya, Syria [Grinin, Issaev, and Korotayev 2016; Grinin and Korotayev 2016, 2022; Grinin *et al.* 2019]), in some other countries (Grinin *et al.* 2015), as well as in Ukraine (Grinin 2014, 2015a, 2015b). As for Ukraine, it is obvious that the formation of statehood takes time; 30 years of independence are clearly not enough for this. The elite and the nation need experience, a clear understanding that one should live together, or the conviction that one should better separate. Our research has shown (*Ibid.*) that many seemingly strange, difficult to explain and frankly negative features of the foreign and domestic policy of modern independent Ukraine are largely due to the geopolitical and historical features of the state formation, mentality and established traditions of sociopolitical psychology (Barabash 2012). It is also obvious that many geopolitical and other factors of the past that negatively affect the stability of the state have not lost their significance today. Their modern influence is important for explaining and forecasting events in Ukraine.

At the same time, it should be noted that, on the one hand, the Ukrainian population, being under the rule of Russia (and Austria) for 250 years, acquired steady life skills within the framework of an organized state and developed a mentality of subordination to state discipline, as well as formed bureaucracy,

i.e. numerous officials staff. This determines the fundamental differences between the Ukrainian nation and many young states (and some former territories of the USSR, such as Chechnya, as well as young African and some Middle Eastern states), whose population had neither experience of living in the mature state, nor a stable understanding of the conditions of this life. However, on the other hand, Ukraine did not have long experience of independent statehood, which seriously affects the behavior of the elite (which prefers to rely on foreign states rather than its own forces), especially in the absence of a clear domestic and external policy course.

Fourth, one cannot ignore the connection of the issue under consideration with the problems of instability of young democratic regimes (for the weaknesses of young democracies see Aron 1993; Grinin and Korotayev 2014; Grinin, Issaev, and Korotayev 2016; Korotayev, Slinko, and Bilyuga 2016; Korotayev *et al.* 2016, 2017, 2024; Kostin and Korotayev 2024; Slinko *et al.* 2017). The transition to democracy from monarchy, autocracy or other regime is always fraught with serious socio-political upheavals (see Aron 1993). However, if the transition to democracy occurs simultaneously with the creation of a new state (as it was in Ukraine and in many former colonies, and before that in Latin American countries), the risks of instability are doubled. Moreover, objectively speaking, the modern standard of the state regime (namely democratic with all the freedoms and universal suffrage) actually exceeds the achieved level of economic development of many modernizing countries. One should mention that Western democracy overcame a rather long path of limited democracy with rigid electoral qualifications, until it became (after the process of economic modernization and mainly after the completion of the demographic transition) the regime of full democracy. But even in this situation, many countries have not escaped revolutions.

Conclusion

Our quantitative analysis showed a strong and statistically significant correlation between the age of the state and the level of socio-political destabilization. A particularly high level of socio-political instability is characteristic of very young states under the age of nine years. The transition to the next time period (9–25 years) results in a significant reduction in the average level of sociopolitical instability. An especially marked increase in the level of stability of states occurs during the transition to the time period of 25–35 years. In general, the average level of sociopolitical instability for the oldest states (with an age of existence of more than 200 years) is more than 30 times lower than for the youngest states (under the age of nine years).

In conclusion, one should note that the age of the existence of the state is a very specific changing parameter. In fact, it cannot be quickly increased. The state needs more than 200 years in order to enter a relatively stable zone of

‘more than 200 years’. But it can be reduced very quickly, for this purpose it is enough to organize a successful separation of the territory from the old state and create a new state on it.

Thus, this analysis shows a powerful potential for sociopolitical destabilization inherent in any kind of separatism/struggle for independence. Even if the struggle for independence is conducted under perfectly just slogans, it is still associated with powerful long-term risks of sociopolitical destabilization, just because the creation of any new state significantly increases the risks of sociopolitical destabilization in the relevant territory for many years to come.

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Appendix

Database on the Age of Statehood

Country	Year of Independence	Status of the Country	Source
Afghanistan	1919	Independence from the UK	Afghanistan. A Dictionary... 2015
Albania	1913	Independence from the Ottoman Empire	Albania. A Dictionary... 2015
Algeria	1962	Independence from France	Algeria. A Dictionary... 2015
Andorra	803	Independence from the Crown of Aragone	Andorra. A Dictionary... 2015
Angola	1975	Independence from Portugal	Angola. A Dictionary... 2015
Antigua and Barbuda	1981	Independence from the UK	Antigua and Barbuda. A Dictionary... 2015
Argentina	1816	Declared independence from Spain	Argentina. A Dictionary... 2015
Armenia	1990	Independence from the USSR	Armenia. A Dictionary... 2015
Aruba	1996	Autonomy from the Netherlands	Aruba. A Dictionary... 2016
Australia	1901	Independence from the UK	Australia. A Dictionary... 2015
Austria	1918	The First Republic	Austria. A Dictionary... 2015
Azerbaijan	1991	Independence from the USSR	Azerbaijan. A Dictionary... 2015
The Bahamas	1973	Independence from the UK	Bahamas. A Dictionary... 2015
Bahrain	1971	Independence from the UK	Bahrain. A Dictionary... 2015
Bangladesh	1971	Independence from Pakistan	Bangladesh. A Dictionary... 2015
Barbados	1966	Independence from the UK	Barbados. A Dictionary... 2015
Belarus	1991	Independence from the USSR	Belarus. A Dictionary... 2015
Belgium	1839	Recognized independence from the Netherlands	Belgium. A Dictionary... 2015
Belize	1981	Independence from the UK	Belize. A Dictionary... 2015
Benin	1960	Independence from France	Benin. A Dictionary... 2015

Continuation of Table

Country	Year of Independence	Status of the Country	Source
Bhutan	1907	Monarchy under the Wangchuck dynasty	Bhutan. A Dictionary... 2015
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	Independence from Yugoslavia	Bosnia and Herzegovina. A Dictionary... 2015
Botswana	1966	Independence from the UK	Botswana. A Dictionary... 2015
Brazil	1822	Recognized independence from Portugal	Brazil. A Dictionary... 2015
Brunei Darussalam	1984	Independence from the UK	Brunei Darussalam. A Dictionary... 2015
Bulgaria	1908	Independence from the Ottoman Empire	Bulgaria. A Dictionary... 2015
Burkina Faso	1960	Independence from France	Burkina Faso. A Dictionary... 2015
Burundi	1962	Independence from Belgium	Burundi. A Dictionary... 2015
Cambodia	1953	Independence from France	Cambodia. A Dictionary... 2015
Cameroon	1960	Independence from France	Cameroon. A Dictionary... 2015
Central African Republic	1960	Independence from France	Central African Republic. A Dictionary... 2015
Chad	1960	Independence from France	Chad. A Dictionary... 2015
Chile	1810	Recognized independence from Spain	Chile. A Dictionary... 2015
China	2070 BCE	First Pre-imperial Dynasty	China. A Dictionary... 2015
Cisikei	1981	Nominal national state	Cisikei. A Dictionary... 2015
Costa Rica	1838	Recognized independence from Spain	Costa Rica. A Dictionary... 2015
Cote d'Ivoire	1960	Independence from France	Cote d'Ivoire. A Dictionary... 2015
Croatia	1992	Independence from Yugoslavia	Croatia. A Dictionary... 2015
Czechoslovakia	1918	Independence	Czechoslovakia. A Dictionary... 2015
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1960	Independence from Belgium	Congo, the Democratic Republic ... A Dictionary... 2015

Continuation of Table

Country	Year of Independence	Status of the Country	Source
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1948	Creation of the State	Korea, Democratic People's Republic. A Dictionary... 2015
Denmark	1320	Unification	Denmark. A Dictionary... 2015
Djibouti	1977	Independence from France	Djibouti. A Dictionary... 2015
Dominica	1978	Independence from the UK	Dominica. A Dictionary... 2015
Dominican Republic	1924	Independence from the United States	Dominican Republic. A Dictionary... 2015
East Timor	2002	Restoration of independence	Timor-Leste. A Dictionary... 2015
Ecuador	1822	Recognized independence from Spain	Ecuador. A Dictionary... 2015
Egypt	1922	Independence from the UK	Egypt. A Dictionary... 2015
El Salvador	1903	The independent State	El Salvador. A Dictionary... 2015
Equatorial Guinea	1968	Independence from Spain	Equatorial Guinea. A Dictionary... 2015
Eritrea	1993	The legal status of the State	Eritrea. A Dictionary... 2015
Estonia	1918	Recognized independence	Estonia. A Dictionary... 2015
Ethiopia	1941	Creation of the State	Ethiopia. A Dictionary... 2015
Fiji	1970	Independence from the UK	Fiji. A Dictionary... 2015
Finland	1919	Recognized independence from the Russian Empire	Finland. A Dictionary... 2015
France	1066	Unification of France	France. A Dictionary... 2015
Gabon	1960	Independence from France	Gabon. A Dictionary... 2015
Gambia	1965	Independence from the UK	Gambia. A Dictionary... 2015
Ghana	1957	Declared Independence from the UK	Ghana. A Dictionary... 2015
Georgia	1991	Recognized Independence from the USSR	Georgia. A Dictionary... 2015

Continuation of Table

Country	Year of Independence	Status of the Country	Source
Germany	1867	German unification	Germany. A Dictionary... 2015
German Democratic Republic	1949	Division of Germany	German Democratic Republic. A Dictionary... 2015
Greece	1833	Recognized Independence from the Ottoman Empire	Greece. A Dictionary... 2015
Grenada	1974	Independence from the UK	Grenada. A Dictionary... 2015
Guatemala	1821	Declared independence from Spain	Guatemala. A Dictionary... 2015
Guinea	1958	Independence from France	Guinea. A Dictionary... 2015
Guinea Bissau	1974	Recognized independence from Portugal	Guinea-Bissau. A Dictionary... 2015
Houthi in North Yemen	2015	Assumption of power by the Houthis in the North of Yemen	Yemen North. A Dictionary... 2015
Iceland	1944	Withdrawal from the Danish Monarchy	Iceland. A Dictionary... 2015
India	1947	Independence from the UK	India. A Dictionary... 2015
Indonesia	1945	Declared independence from the Netherlands	Indonesia. A Dictionary... 2015
Iran	550	Achaemenid Empire	Iran, Islamic Republic of. A Dictionary... 2015
Iraq	1932	Independence from the UK	Iraq. A Dictionary... 2015
Ireland	1921	Independence from the UK	Ireland. A Dictionary... 2015
Israel	1948	Recognized independence	Israel. A Dictionary... 2015
Italy	1861	Unification of Italy	Italy. A Dictionary... 2015
Jamaica	1962	Independence from the UK	Jamaica. A Dictionary... 2015
Japan	660	Creation of the State	Japan. A Dictionary... 2015
Jordan	1946	Mandate territory	Jordan. A Dictionary... 2015
Kazakhstan	1991	Recognized Independence from the USSR	Kazakhstan. A Dictionary... 2015

Continuation of Table

Country	Year of Independence	Status of the Country	Source
Kenya	1963	Independence from the UK	Kenya. A Dictionary... 2015
Kiribati	1979	Independence from the UK	Kiribati. A Dictionary... 2015
Korea, Republic	1948	Independence from Japan	Korea, Republic of. A Dictionary... 2015
Kosovo	2008	Declaration of Independence	Kosovo. A Dictionary... 2015
Kuwait	1961	Independence from the UK	Kuwait. A Dictionary... 2015
Kyrgyzstan	1991	Recognised Independence from the USSR	Kyrgyzstan. A Dictionary... 2015
Qatar	1971	Independence from the UK	Qatar. A Dictionary... 2015
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1953	Independence from France	Lao People's Democratic Republic. A Dictionary... 2015
Latvia	1991	Recognized independence from the USSR	Latvia. A Dictionary... 2015
Lebanon	1945	Independence from France	Lebanon. A Dictionary... 2015
Lesotho	1966	Independence from the UK	Lesotho. A Dictionary... 2015
Liberia	1847	Recognized independence	Liberia. A Dictionary... 2015
Libya	1951	Liberation from Britain and France	Libya. A Dictionary... 2015
Liechtenstein	1866	Liberation from Germany	Liechtenstein. A Dictionary... 2015
Lithuania	1918	Declaration of independence from Germany	Lithuania. A Dictionary... 2015
Luxembourg	1815	Independence from the Netherlands	Luxembourg. A Dictionary... 2015
Madagascar	1960	Independence from France	Madagascar. A Dictionary... 2015
Macedonia	1993	Recognized independence from Yugoslavia	Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia A Dictionary... 2015
Malawi	1964	Independence from the UK	Malawi. A Dictionary... 2015

Continuation of Table

Country	Year of Independence	Status of the Country	Source
Malaysia	1963	Independence of the State	Malaysia. A Dictionary... 2015
Maldives	1965	Independence from the UK	Maldives. A Dictionary... 2015
Mali	1960	Independence from France	Mali. A Dictionary... 2015
Malta	1964	Independence from the UK	Malta. A Dictionary... 2015
Mauritania	1960	Independence from France	Mauritania. A Dictionary... 2015
Mauritius	1968	Independence from the UK	Mauritius. A Dictionary... 2015
Morocco	1956	Independence of the State	Morocco. A Dictionary... 2015
Marshall Islands	1991	Independence of the State	Marshall Islands. A Dictionary... 2015
Mexico	1836	Recognized independence from Spain	Mexico. A Dictionary... 2015
Micronesia	1986	Creation of the State	Micronesia, Federated States of. A Dictionary... 2015
Moldova	1991	Recognized independence from the USSR	Moldova, Republic of. A Dictionary... 2015
Monaco	1861	Creation of the State	Monaco. A Dictionary... 2015
Mongolia	1911	Independence from the Qing Empire	Mongolia. A Dictionary... 2015
Montenegro	2006	Restoration of independence from Yugoslavia	Montenegro. A Dictionary... 2015
Mozambique	1975	Independence from Portugal	Mozambique. A Dictionary... 2015
Myanmar	1948	Independence from the UK	Myanmar. A Dictionary... 2015
Namibia	1990	Independence from South Africa	Namibia. A Dictionary... 2015
Nauru	1968	Independence from the UK	Nauru. A Dictionary... 2015
Nepal	1769	Creation of the State	Nepal. A Dictionary... 2015
Netherlands Antilles	1954	Creation of the State	Netherlands Antilles. A Dictionary... 2015

Continuation of Table

Country	Year of Independence	Status of the Country	Source
Netherlands	1648	Creation of the State	Netherlands. A Dictionary... 2015
New Zealand	1907	Great Britain dominion	New Zealand. A Dictionary... 2015
Nicaragua	1838	Recognized independence from Spain	Nicaragua. A Dictionary... 2015
Niger	1960	Independence from France	Niger. A Dictionary... 2015
Nigeria	1960	Recognized independence from the UK	Nigeria. A Dictionary... 2015
Norway	1807	Creation of the State	Norway. A Dictionary... 2015
Oman	130	Creation of the State	Oman. A Dictionary... 2015
Pakistan	1947	Great Britain dominion	Pakistan. A Dictionary... 2015
Palau	1994	Compact of Free Association with the USA	Palau. A Dictionary... 2015
Palestine, state	1988	Declaration of independence	Palestine, State. A Dictionary... 2015
Panama	1903	Independence from Colombia	Panama. A Dictionary... 2015
Papua – New Guinea	1975	Recognized independence from Australia	Papua New Guinea. A Dictionary... 2015
Paraguay	1811	Recognized independence from Spain	Paraguay. A Dictionary... 2015
The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	1967	Creation of the independent state	Yemen People's Republic. A Dictionary... 2015
Peru	1821	Recognized independence from Spain	Peru. A Dictionary... 2015
Philippines	1946	Independence from the USA	Philippines. A Dictionary... 2015
Poland	1987	Creation of the State	Poland. A Dictionary... 2015
Portugal	1179	Recognition of the State	Portugal. A Dictionary... 2015
Romania	1878	Independence from the Ottoman Empire	Romania. A Dictionary... 2015
Russian Federation	1991	Creation of the State	Russian Federation. A Dictionary... 2015

Continuation of Table

Country	Year of Independence	Status of the Country	Source
Rwanda	1962	Independence from Belgium	Rwanda. A Dictionary... 2015
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1983	Independence from the UK	Saint Kitts and Nevis. A Dictionary... 2015
Saint Lucia	1979	Independence from the UK	Saint Lucia. A Dictionary... 2015
Samoa	1962	Independence from New Zealand	Samoa. A Dictionary... 2015
San Marino	1291	Independence from the Roman Empire	San Marino. A Dictionary... 2015
Sao Tome and Principe	1975	Independence from Portugal	Sao Tome and Principe. A Dictionary... 2015
Saudi Arabia	1932	Creation of the State	Saudi Arabia. A Dictionary... 2015
Senegal	1960	Independence from France	Senegal. A Dictionary... 2015
Serbia	1878	Creation of the Principality of Serbia	Serbia. A Dictionary... 2015
Seychelles	1976	Independence from the UK	Seychelles. A Dictionary... 2015
Sierra Leone	1961	Independence from the UK	Sierra Leone. A Dictionary... 2015
Singapore	1965	Independence from the UK	Singapore. A Dictionary... 2015
Slovakia	1993	Independence from Czechoslovakia	Slovakia. A Dictionary... 2015
Slovenia	1991	Independence from Czechoslovakia	Slovenia. A Dictionary... 2015
Solomon Islands	1978	Independence from the UK	Solomon Islands. A Dictionary... 2015
Somalia	1960	Independence	Somalia. A Dictionary... 2015
The Soviet Union	1922	Treaty on the creation of the USSR	Soviet Union. A Dictionary... 2015
South Africa	1961	Independence from the UK	South Africa. A Dictionary... 2015
South Sudan	2011	Independence from Sudan	South Sudan. A Dictionary... 2015
Sri Lanka	1948	Dominion of Great Britain	Sri Lanka. A Dictionary... 2015

Continuation of Table

Country	Year of Independence	Status of the Country	Source
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1979	Independence from the UK	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. A Dictionary... 2015
Sudan	1956	Independence from the UK	Sudan. A Dictionary... 2015
Suriname	1975	Independence from the Netherlands	Suriname. A Dictionary... 2015
Swaziland	1968	Independence from the UK	Swaziland. A Dictionary... 2015
Sweden	1523	Creation of the State	Sweden. A Dictionary... 2015
Switzerland	1848	Unification of the State	Switzerland. A Dictionary... 2015
Syrian Arab Republic	1941	Independence from France	Syrian Arab Republic. A Dictionary... 2015
Taiwan	1949	Unrecognized independence from the PRC	Taiwan, Province of China. A Dictionary... 2015
Tajikistan	1991	Recognized independence from the USSR	Tajikistan. A Dictionary... 2015
Tanzania	1967	Independence from the UK	Tanzania, United Republic. A Dictionary... 2015
Thailand	1238	Creation of the State	Thailand. A Dictionary... 2015
Togo	1960	Independence from France	Togo. A Dictionary... 2015
Tonga	1970	Independence from the UK	Tonga. A Dictionary... 2015
Transkei	1976	Creation of the State	Transkei. A Dictionary... 2015
Trinidad and Tobago	1962	Independence from the UK	Trinidad and Tobago. A Dictionary... 2015
Tunisia	1955	Independence from France	Tunisia. A Dictionary... 2015
Turkey	1923	The legacy of the Ottoman Empire	Turkey. A Dictionary... 2015
Turkmenistan	1991	Recognized independence from the USSR	Turkmenistan. A Dictionary... 2015
Tuvalu	1978	Independence from the UK	Tuvalu. A Dictionary... 2015
Uganda	1962	Independence from the UK	Uganda. A Dictionary... 2015

Continuation of Table

Country	Year of Independence	Status of the Country	Source
Ukraine	1991	Recognized independence from the USSR	Ukraine. A Dictionary... 2015
The United Arab Emirates	1971	Independence from the UK	United Arab Emirates. A Dictionary... 2015
The United States of America	1783	Completion of the separation of the United States from Great Britain	United States. A Dictionary... 2015
Uruguay	1828	Independence from Brazil	Uruguay. A Dictionary... 2015
Yugoslavia	1929	Creation of the State	Yugoslavia. A Dictionary... 2015
Uzbekistan	1991	Recognized independence from the USSR	Uzbekistan. A Dictionary... 2015
Zambia	1964	Recognized Independence from the UK	Zambia. A Dictionary... 2015
Zimbabwe	1980	Recognized Independence from the UK	Zimbabwe. A Dictionary... 2015